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This chapter discusses several possible reasons why works by women philosophers have 
traveled significantly less than those written by men, although women’s contributions go 
back to the start of European history of philosophy. Differentiating between geographic, 
linguistic, historic and philosophical travels, Tove Pettersen claims that gender is 
particularly significant with regard to historical and philosophical traveling. As the case of 
women philosophers clearly demonstrate, gender hampers the circulation of certain texts 
and inhibit transhistorical exchange of knowledge and ideas.  
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Che chapitre examine plusieurs raisons possibles pour expliquer pourquoi les œuvres de 
femmes philosophes ont “voyage” beaucoup moins que celle des hommes, bien que la 
contribution des femmes remonte au début de l´histoire européenne de la philosophie. 
Distinguant entre plusieurs façons de voyager – géographique, linguistique, historique et 
philosophique –, Tove Pettersen soutient que le “genre” est un facteur particulièrement 
significative par rapport au voyage historique et philosophique- Comme le démontre 
clairement le cas des femmes philosophes, leur genre nuit á la circulation de certains textes 
ainsi qu’à l’échange transnational du savoir et des idées. 
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1. DEFINING ‘TRAVEL’ 
The term ‘travel’ does not refer exclusively to how texts written in one country are translated, 
promoted and read in other countries (geographic and linguistic travel). It also alludes to travel 
through time (historical travel), and to what genre and discipline texts are travelling in (genre 
travel). Although the various ways texts travels are not always aligned with one another, gender 
influence all these different journeys. Gender can affect how texts are read, promoted and 
translated. Gender can also prevent texts from travelling in certain genres, and sometimes from 
travelling at all. This is indeed the case for women in the European history of philosophy. The 
main focus in this article will be on how philosophical texts authored by women have travelled 
far less well through history (historical travel), and still do not travel as philosophical texts 
(genre travel) into the standard European canon and history of philosophy on equal footing 
with men’s writing – despite the fact that women’s philosophical contributions go back to the 
start of our history. 
In what follows, I discuss several possible hypotheses why there is such a striking 
gender difference in the historical and philosophical travelling of texts written by women. 
These hypotheses are organized in three groups. The first group includes reasons related to the 
authors of the texts; the second concerns the readers; while the third relates to institutional and 
discursive structures. I do not aim to present an all-inclusive list of arguments, or to argue for 
a single, exhaustive, explanatory hypothesis. Women’s exclusion is a complex phenomenon, 
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and several factors are undoubtedly working in conjunction. My aim is to show how gender 
not only affects how texts are translated, promoted and read, but also, as in the case of women 
philosophers, determines whether they are allowed to travel at all.   
 
2. THE HARM OF EXCLUSION  
As feminist philosophers have been documenting for decades, there have been women 
philosophers in every age and epoch.1 Texts written by women philosophers are currently easy 
accessible on several scholarly websites for anyone who wish to include them in their works 
and teaching.2 Many feminist philosophers have argued in favor of including more texts written 
by women.3 Still, traditional portrayals of the European history of philosophy ‒ and indeed 
compilations of European philosophical canons ‒ reveal a striking lack of works written by 
women. The history of philosophy is generally portrayed as there were no, or only a few, 
women philosophers between Socrates and contemporary philosophy. It is not uncommon, 
even today, for students to be handed all-male, and frequently all-white, reading lists by their 
philosophy departments. Indeed, women are conspicuous by their absence even in newly 
minted books on the history of philosophy. The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, for 
example, published in 2015, presented 2,400 years of philosophy over 1,200 pages with 
absolutely no mention of any female contributions before the mid- 20th century.4 This work is 
no exception. Antony Kenny’s 2012 A New History of Western Philosophy contains not a single 
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woman but was nevertheless praised by the Times Higher Education Supplement as 
“wonderfully authoritative.”5  
Many arguments can be given to explain why the non-traveling of texts written by 
women philosophers is highly problematic. One is that the silencing of women’s contributions 
and their dialog with male philosophers entails a false narrative of the history of philosophy, 
as if it consisted solely of men discussing with other men. In fact, the lack of gender balance 
and diversity in the portrayal of the European history of philosophy implies that only male 
members of highly homogeneous social classes with access to higher education contributed to 
the intellectual development of the West. That would be untrue. People from marginalized 
groups of philosophers––women, slaves, and people of color––have contributed to our thinking 
about central ideas such as freedom, oppression, rights, justice, care, and the relationship 
between individuals and communities.6  
Moreover, when the texts that are not traveling systematically belong to specific groups, 
a grave epistemic injustice is committed, not only to the individual authors, the group they 
represent, but also to the circulation of knowledge as such. 7 By robbing students and 
researchers of insight into, among other things, the philosophical development of questions 
across a broad range of topics, the formation of the canon, and the mechanisms that have driven 
certain texts into oblivion, philosophical progress is prevented.  
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Also, the non-traveling of women’s texts most likely concerns the underrepresentation 
of women in the discipline today. As Jessica Gordon-Roth and Nancy Kendrick have noted, 
one reasons why there are so few women in philosophy today is that they feel “they don’t 
belong there,” because, among other things “most undergraduate syllabuses do not include 
texts written by women,” creating the impression in “both male and female students […] that 
women simply are not philosophers.”8 This impression is sustained by the canonical 
philosopher’s portrayal of women as emotional rather than rational beings. As phrased by 
Miranda Fricker: “in a context where rationality is strongly linked to be considered a human, 
one is degraded and humiliated qua human being by such testimonial discredit.”9  Failure to 
acknowledge the contributions of past women philosophers might also contribute to women’s  
underperformance and the absorption of implicit bias against women and their works also 
today.10 Recent studies of citation practices in philosophy show that not only are women of the 
past not referred to, “works by women are cited proportionally far less than works by men” 
even today.11 The non-travelling of women’s philosophical texts is not only a question of 
correcting past wrongs, but matter of justice to past as well as to current generations of women. 
The philosophical and historical travel of women’s texts concerns the contemporary 
discipline’s self-image, truthfulness and accuracy, its future progress and credibility as 
producer of knowledge but also the transhistorical exchange of knowledge and ideas. 
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3. GENDER AND PHILOSOPHICAL TRAVEL  
Whether or not texts are allowed to travel into the canon and the portrayal of an academic 
field’s history is not a minor matter, as both are decisive for the discipline. Focusing here on 
philosophy, “canon” can be explained as a list of authoritative texts within the discipline. It is 
authoritative because, among other things, it is how students in the formative years of their 
education are introduced to the foundation of their subject field. Everyone within the discipline 
is expected to be familiar with these selected works, and be able to discuss, relate, and refer to 
them. Together, canonical texts constitute the textual tradition with which philosophers are in 
conversation through criticism, endorsement, development, refinement, or comparison. 
Moreover, inclusion in the canon is a sign of quality; these texts are taken to represent standards 
of excellence that deserve to be emulated, to travel across time and cultures, and to act as 
regulatory standards with regard to what kind of philosophy is handed down from one 
generation to another. Canonical texts are exemplary. The selection process is not solely about 
which philosophers to include, it also concerns which topics are to be included, as well as the 
boundaries between philosophy and other disciplines such as the history of ideas, theology, 
psychology, and literature.12 Moreover, the canon is highly influential regarding the 
philosophical genre of writing. Not all forms and styles are approved of, even though the 
questions discussed are philosophical. Letters, poetry, and plays are considered to be at odds 
with what is now regarded as the proper form a philosophical text should take.13  
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“The history of philosophy” is broader than “the canon” and is traditionally presented 
as a chronological account of the historical development of what are considered to be the 
philosophically significant questions. Philosophers are expected to know how ideas have 
developed, even if––in contrast to canonical philosophers––they have not studied every single 
philosopher thoroughly. While the canon consists of original philosophical works, the history 
of philosophy is compiled, authored, and edited by one or several philosophers. However, 
neither a canon nor a history of philosophy is written in stone. Philosophy departments make 
changes in both by including some and excluding other philosophers. Differences between 
institutions exist, and there are national variations. Despite this variation, the marginalization 
of women is a common feature.  
When works of women philosophers are excluded from reading lists and new 
“authoritative” books on history of philosophy, students are given the impression that there are 
no (good) women philosophers.14 This view still serves as an explanation for the absence of 
women’s texts in philosophy.15 Given the fact that the existence of women philosophers is well 
documented, and the harm of omitting them are severe, how can we explain the gender gap in 
how texts travel into the discipline’s canon and the portrayal of its history? Just as past texts 
written by women are not allowed to travel philosophically, contemporary feminist philosophy 
is also marginalized. 16 Consequently, new feminist publications on history of philosophy do 
not reach the center of the discipline where decisions on the curriculum is made. Today’s 
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students are meet with the same arguments I received as a student 30 years ago when 
questioning the absence of women’s texts in philosophy.17 However, even without being fully 
familiar with the recovery of past women philosophers, these arguments do not, as we shall 
see, hold up to scrutiny.  
 
4. AUTHOR CENTERED ARGUMENTS 
The historical lack of opportunities for women to train as philosophers sounds on the face of it 
a plausible explanation for those not familiar with feminist philosophy. With the exception of 
women in monasteries, and to a lesser extent, women in royal courts, it was not until the 17th 
century that women were allowed some modicum of education. But it was generally designed 
to develop and strengthen what were taken as women’s ‘natural predispositions,’ such as 
sensitivity, modesty, chastity, obedience, innocence and a capacity to care ‒ all of which 
contributed to women’s passivity. As a view, it was endorsed by prominent philosophers such 
as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant. Women, Kant argued, were not fit for 
philosophical reflection: “her philosophical wisdom is not reasoning but sentiment.”18 Of Anne 
Dacier, who translated the Iliad and the Odyssey and other classics from Greek and Latin to 
French, and the Marquise du Châtelet, a renowned philosopher and translator of Newton’s 
Principia Mathematica, Kant stated, they might “as well also wear a beard; for that might 
perhaps better express the mien of depth for which they strive.”19 Given the historical exclusion 
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of women from higher education, and the alleged conflict between philosophical thinking and 
the female gender, it seems reasonable to suggest that since women could not become 
philosophers they made no texts available for travelling.  
But in addition to being proven untrue the assumption is problematic for other reasons. 
First, it implies that the author needs a formal philosophical education in order to write a 
philosophical text. However, although neither Plato nor Aristotle had university degrees in 
philosophy, both are now canonical. In contrast, none of the women philosophers who were 
active in the classical and medieval periods, such as Aesara of Lucania, Diotima of Matinea, 
Hildegard of Bingen, and Catherine of Siena, are included in standard representations of the 
history of philosophy. Moreover, although women had very restricted access to formal 
education in philosophy even after it was institutionalized, there was extensive activity by 
women outside academia during the entire Renaissance. There were networks of women 
philosophers who communicated by letter; philosophical journals, pamphlets, and treatises 
were published and read by women. There were salons, clubs, and convents in all of which 
women discussed matters of philosophical significance.20  
Another possible explanation for the exclusion of women from philosophical travel is 
that the topics and questions they wrote about were not considered philosophical.21 A closer 
examination, however, reveals that women philosophers have been concerned since antiquity 
with the same variety of philosophical topics and questions as male philosophers: natural 
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philosophy, political and moral philosophy, metaphysics, free will, freedom, education, 
philosophy of mind, and so on. This holds true for the philosophy of gender as well. How to 
organize women’s and men’s roles in the private and the public sphere and their right to 
education and political participation was a central philosophical topic for both sexes.  
For example, relations between the sexes were important to Plato as well as Aristotle, 
who laid the foundation for two dominant views on sex and gender in our culture: Plato by 
arguing in the Republic that women and men (except for their role in reproduction) are equal 
by virtue of being rational human beings, and Aristotle by arguing that women and men, also 
in terms of reason and rationality, are essentially different. Furthermore, the complementary 
and extremely influential view of the sexes, i.e. that women and men are fundamentally 
different and meant to supplement each other, can be traced back to antiquity and Pythagoras’ 
tables of opposites. This was the view advocated by, among others, von Bingen in her 12th 
century work Causae et Curae, Rousseau in Emilie (1762), and Kant in Observation (1764), 
and Anthropology (1798) ‒ a view Mary Wollstonecraft forcefully opposed in A Vindication 
of The Rights of Women (1792). Relations between the genders are also discussed by Harriet 
Taylor Mill, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, Fredrick Engels, Emma Goldman, to mention a few.  
The centuries-long and cross-continental debate Querelle de femmes (1400–1789) over 
women’s rationality, virtues, and education is further testament to the influence of discussions 
about sex and gender in our history.22 This broad debate is, in origin and core, a philosophical 
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dispute linked to a shift in which the Neoplatonism of the Renaissance and the rediscovery of 
Plato’s arguments for gender equality challenged the medieval Aristotelian philosophy in 
which male supremacy is central.23 And for the record, not all women argued for equality, and 
not all men were against it ‒ even though the vast majority of canonized philosophers were. 
Historically speaking, “the woman question” was not seen as a particularistic question of 
interest to women only, but as one concerning broad and classical philosophical questions such 
as “who are we?” and “what is uniquely human?”24 The argument that the non-travelling of 
women’s texts is due to their preoccupation with idiosyncratic questions, and insignificant 
particulars, does not hold true.  
One may therefore ask if the striking gender difference in how well text travel 
philosophically has to do with the fact that women philosophers have taken positions that are 
now outdated and thus of only historical interest.25 If the history of philosophy was written on 
the assumption that it should only include questions and theories of direct relevance to today’s 
debates, this argument might have some force. But this is not how the history of philosophy is 
written. Nor is it how philosophical texts are canonized. New students do not read about 
Aristotle’s four causes, Plato's world of ideas, Descartes’ arguments for the existence of God, 
or Kant’s twelve categories because these theories represent true knowledge or have direct 
relevance today. As a matter of fact, some male philosophers’ opinions on outdated topics are 
represented in the canon, while women philosophers writing on issues still of relevance, such 
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as, gender roles, virtues, ethics, right to life and education are excluded. To say that women 
philosophers are omitted travelling because their positions are outdated is therefore not a 
credible argument.26 
Another reason for women’s exclusion from philosophical travelling, one might 
suggest, is that they were not sufficiently influential and recognized in their own time to 
deserve a place in the history of philosophy, let alone the canon.27 It is not enough, one might 
assert, for them to merely have written philosophy. They also need to have been acknowledged 
as philosophers by contemporary philosophers, and taken part in contemporary debates, in 
order to be allowed to travel. This suggestion is also problematic. The fact is that even the most 
influential, recognized, discussed, and renowned women philosophers in their day, have still 
not travelled into contemporary canon or history of philosophy.  
Sophia’s essay Woman Not Inferior to Man, published in 1739,28 is a good example. In 
the same year a ‘Gentleman’ published a response titled Man Superior to Woman and in 1740 
Sophia countered with a second essay, Women’s Superior Excellence of Man. These texts were 
reprinted several times in England over the next fifty years.29 Many of the issues Sophia 
grappled with most likely animated other contemporary philosophers, including David Hume. 
Both are empiricists, interested in the character of women and men, and both assign an 
important role to habit in the formation of gender. Like Sophia in her 1739 essay, Hume too 
draws attention to the ‘is/ought’ fallacy and the idea of an ‘impartial spectator’ in his A Treatise 
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of Human Nature (1739-1740). There are reasons to believe Hume knew of Sophia, and 
probably read her work, although he never mentions her.30 Woman Not Inferior to Man was 
translated into French several times. Madeline de Puisieux, a close acquaintance of Denis 
Diderot, probably translated the 1751 version of Sophia’s text. If so, and given the close 
relationship between Diderot and Rousseau, Sophia’s work was very likely known to 
Rousseau. It may perhaps have prompted him to create the character of Sophie presented in 
book V of Emilie.31 Despite the linguistic and geographical travels of Sophia’s texts in her own 
time, she is not mentioned today other than in specialist works on women philosophers. Sophia 
belongs to the forgotten philosophers, while Hume and Rousseau, whom she preceded, are 
canonized.  
Another example is Wollstonecraft, whose philosophical influence on European and 
American women’s rights movements was immense. Her Vindication was published first in 
London 1792, then in two separate editions in Boston and Philadelphia in 1792, two more 
separate editions in Philadelphia in 1794, and five in New York in 1833, 1845, 1856, 1890, 
and 1891 respectively.32 In 1792, Vindication was also translated into French and German, with 
several German translations appearing in the subsequent decades. In 1796, it was translated 
into Dutch, and in 1900 into Portuguese.33 Rousseau is one of Wollstonecraft’s contemporaries, 
and Vindication was translated and published in time for Kant to read it before writing his 
Anthropology. Wollstonecraft’s work has not made it into the present-day canon, despite being 
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read, translated and debated by her contemporaries, and having developed a philosophical 
position that not only refutes the views of Rousseau and Kant on gender, but remains highly 
relevant today. Yet another example of an influential, but forgotten female philosopher, is 
Catharine Trotter Cockburn, who during her lifetime was publicly acknowledge and admired 
for her philosophical abilities by significant philosophers such as John Locke and Gottfried 
Leibniz. 34 
As these select examples illustrate, although philosophical texts written by women 
addressed much-debated topics, and travelled geographically as well as linguistically in their 
own time––not unlike men’s philosophical texts with which they were in (thematic) dialog – 
they did not travel across time as contributions to the discipline. The fact that texts written by 
women philosophers have not traveled historically and philosophically cannot be explained by 
women’s failure to participate in or to influence contemporary philosophical debates.  
Could it be that the gender-gap in travelling is a matter of quality? Today, the form and 
writing style of contemporary analytical philosophy resemble what Genevieve Lloyd (1984) 
portrays as the conception of ‘maleness’, which in turn is similar to how ‘philosophy’ is 
commonly understood in Western philosophy: Since Plato, reason, objectivity, and the 
universal have been associated with maleness, and femaleness with what philosophy must 
transcend.35 Perhaps women are simply not as good as men in ‘male’ reasoning and writing? 
Or, as research on the effect of implicit bias and stereotypes suggests, perhaps 
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underperformance is to be expected “by those stereotypically taken to be less good at 
philosophy.”36 Maybe women’s choice of writing style is considered non-philosophical?37 If 
women, for whatever reasons, did not write in accordance with the norms of ‘good’ philosophy, 
this could explain why their texts have not travelled down the years as philosophical works. 
However, before accepting this explanation, we need to discuss what counts as good 
philosophy, and who sets the standard.  
Today, conceptions of good philosophy are closely related to a particular form, more 
precisely an analytical style in which clarity, precision, logical structure, abstraction, and 
impersonality are central. In the 16th and 17th centuries, however, certain genres were 
considered masculine while others, such as short stories and poems, were considered 
feminine.38 If we examine the style of texts by philosophers of the period, in which women 
took part in philosophical discussions outside academia, several belong to the “feminine 
genre.” These writings contain not only rational arguments and deductive conclusions 
presented in the rigorous form we expect from today’s philosophers. They appeal to the 
readers’ emotions and imagination, and are often quite personal. Concepts are not always used 
unambiguously, and the style of writing can be familial and explorative, as opposed to 
confrontational and authoritative. Catherine Macauly, for example, presented her ideas on 
freedom of the will and the relationship between ethics, politics, and education, in the form of 
personal letters addressed to a fictional female friend.39 Margaret Cavendish experimented with 
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different genres, and alternated between fictitious correspondence and poems, and a more 
analytical style of writing when she discussed Descartes’ dualism, materialism, vitalism, 
vegetarianism, and God.40 In her nine plays, she explores the notion of freedom by asking how 
a woman in the seventeenth century can be free.41  
Continental philosophy today, which allows a more narrative and explorative style than 
the analytic tradition, would have no problem in accepting Cavendish’s writings as philosophy. 
Even current analytical philosophers would find it difficult not to acknowledge her texts as 
philosophical.42 Still, Cavendish’s texts are not included in canon or the history of philosophy 
which even have room for male philosophers who violate todays acknowledged philosophical 
form. Plato, whose rightful place on the authoritative list is undisputed, wrote dialogues. He 
uses first-person narratives, anecdotes, examples from everyday life, and does not always draw 
clear conclusions. In Méditations and Discours de la méthode, Descartes deviates from the 
impersonal style by writing in first person singular, “I,” in a style resembling a diary. Descartes 
demonstrates a variety of ways of expressing philosophical ideas. If it is possible to give Plato 
and Descartes a place in the canon despite their “feminine” writing style, one can hardly make 
a case against including Cavendish and Macauly for using the same style. Both genders wrote 
in both genres. Still, texts written by male philosophers in both the feminine and masculine 
genres have travelled historically and philosophically, while women’s texts in the both genres 
systematically have been discredited and excluded from travelling.  
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5. READER CENTERED ARGUMENTS  
Several feminist philosophers argue in favor of another hypothesis to explain why women 
philosophers’ texts do not travel in the history and canon of philosophy, namely that our 
Western cultural conception of gender, where men are perceived as human and women as 
females, negatively influences how women’s texts are read, evaluated, promoted and received. 
Given our culture’s gendered myths and binary gender ideology, associating women with the 
particular and men with the universal, actually makes the term “woman philosopher” an 
oxymoron.43 In The Man-Made World (1911), Charlotte Perkins Gilman already questions why 
there are no columns discussing “masculine” literature and men’s writings while there are 
plenty of discussions of “feminine” literature and women’s writing. The reason for this, she 
asserts, is because “Men are people! Women, being the sex, have their limited feminine 
interests, their feminine point of view […] Men having been accepted as humanity, women but 
a side-issue […].”44 
Beauvoir makes a similar point in The Second Sex (1949): women give expression to 
the particular, not the universal, she states. Women and femaleness are associated with the 
emotions, the private, with nature, the subjective, the particular etc.–– all that philosophy is 
not. 45 Consequently, translators, readers and reviewers tend to focus on the particular and 
contextual in philosophical works authored by women, and overlook these elements and 
accentuate the universal in texts by male philosophers.46 Ironically, readers of the book in which 
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Beauvoir provides an explanation for the biased interpretation of women’s writings, prove her 
hypothesis; she is accused of being “unsatisfied, cold, priapic, nymphomaniac, lesbian, a 
hundred times aborted, [and] an unmarried mother.”47 In his introduction to his English 
translation of The Second Sex, H.M. Parshley justifies removing approximately 100 pages of 
philosophy by declaring that “Mlle de Beauvoir’s book is, after all, on women, not on 
philosophy.”48 Parshely’s opinion testifies to the view that the universal and philosophical is 
considered incompatible with being, or writing about, women, and (literally) prevented 
Beauvoir’s text from travelling as a philosophical text. The review of the 2007 Norwegian 
translation of Beauvoir’s metaphysical novel L’Invitée provides a more recent example of this 
tendency to emphasize the particular, and downplay the universal dimensions in women’s 
philosophical writings. In this text Beauvoir discusses classical philosophical questions such 
as determinism and free will, bad faith, the conflict between reason and emotions, and the limits 
of individual freedom. However, for the reviewer, “Simone de Beauvoir reveals the distorted 
picture of the romantic relationship to Jean-Paul Sartre, and offers readers a dark drama of 
jealousy in extremis.”49 Instead of being read as discussing philosophical questions, she is 
interpreted as fretting over personal romantic love.50 
The hypothesis that the reader is gender biased also explains why women philosophers 
are sometimes presented as rare exceptions to the rule.51 When it is impossible to ignore a gifted 
woman ‒ be it Dacier, du Châtelet, Wollstonecraft, Taylor Mill or Beauvoir ‒ they are deemed 
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extraordinary, deviations from nature’s normal course. As O’Neill points out, normalizing such 
women philosophers would threaten the entire patriarchal order, the theoretical dichotomies as 
well as the cultural structures. On the one hand, accepting women as the equal of men in 
intellectual standing challenges the traditional arguments for confining women to the private 
sphere as domestic caretakers. On the other hand, since the philosophical ideas advocated by 
many women philosophers often explicitly confront the existing social order and gendered 
hierarchies, portraying them as deviations and pouring scorn on them serves to defuse the 
power of their thinking and radical ideas.52  
The gender biased reading hypothesis illuminates yet another tendency, namely to see 
women philosophers as mere disciples of male philosophers. Their thinking is not interpreted 
as original, but rather as an application or extension of their philosophical masters’ thoughts. 
This reading deprives women of philosophical autonomy and agency, and see them instead 
simply as messengers. To mention just a few examples: Mary Astell has been perceived as a 
passive beneficiary of John Morris’s “superior philosophical skills,”53  and Cockburn “a simple 
mouthpiece for [Locke’s] philosophy.”54 Beauvoir’s The Second Sex has been read as a 
“wedding gift [where] she brings a singular confirmation of the validity of Sartrism,”55 and as 
an “application of Sartre’s ‘phenomenology of interpersonal relationships.’”56 The implicit bias 
in reading of philosophical works of women as mere responses to male philosophers has not 
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only prevented their texts from travelling as philosophical texts in their own right, but, as in 
the case of Trotter Cockburn, from traveling at all.   
 
6. INSTITUTIONAL AND DISCURSIVE STRUCTURES  
Whether or not readers of philosophical texts are gender biased is actually an empirical 
question. One might be inclined to say that even if some readers most likely are gender biased, 
it is unlikely all readers are biased. If not all are biased and some explicitly endorse the works 
of women, the explanation for women’s exclusion might be structural, not individual. Prejudice 
and bias might be fueled and manifested through the discipline’s norms, traditions, and 
institutionalized criteria for what counts as (good) philosophy where the philosophical canon, 
understood as a collection of the discipline’s most exemplary and important texts is particularly 
important.  
For several decades now, feminist philosophers have criticized and re-read the canon, 
and they have retrieved the works of forgotten women philosophers from oblivion. Notably, 
the works of Astell, Wollstonecraft, Cavendish, Conway, Macaulay, Cockburn, and Beauvoir 
have received substantial attention. Thanks to new editions of their works, commentaries, 
textbooks, journal articles, encyclopedia entries, collections of essays and conferences 
dedicated to their philosophy, works of these women have actually been granted a second 
chance to travel historically as philosophical works in their own right. However, even if works 
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of women philosophers are recognized in some circles, commonly among feminist scholars, 
they are still not recognized by the wider philosophical community as important contributions 
to the discipline’s history and development. And although these texts, thanks to the efforts of 
feminist scholars, have started to travel philosophically, they are still travelling only in the 
margins of the discipline.  
One reason why these texts remain on the outskirts of the discipline, one might suggest, 
is the canon’s androcentrism. If “exemplary” philosophy is intertwined with central norms, 
values, and perspectives associated with men and masculinity, male bias is institutionalized. 
Not only does the bias inform the definition of (good) philosophy by favoring particular topics, 
styles, and perspectives rather than others, it is perpetuated by the manner in which core 
concepts and models are understood: autonomy as independence, “rational man” as a model of 
humanity for example. It is also sustained through engaging with an all-male canon, practiced 
through the selection and evaluation of projects in philosophy departments, exercised in 
classroom discussions, graduations, publication of articles in mainstream journals, etc. In other 
words, due to the discipline’s masculine norms, writings associated with the feminine are 
discredited. Warren argues that women philosophers of the past remain “outside” the 
“canonical house” due to the unforgiving methodological problems of integrating them. “We 
cannot simply add the idea that the world is round to the conviction that the world is flat,” 
Warren says.57  
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However, even if the philosophical canon is androcentric, that does not explain the 
exclusion of all women. As argued above, not all texts written by women contradict the 
masculine norm. Not all men write in accordance with it. Women’s texts cannot be labeled 
gynocentric per se. Moreover, the canonical work of male philosophers does not constitute a 
unified collection: not all male philosophers argue that the world is flat. True, the inclusion of 
some women’s work will introduce new perspectives, challenges, and disagreements in the 
canon. But given that highly contradictory perspectives held by male philosophers already are 
integrated into the canon and the history of philosophy, the question is why disagreement with 
(some of) the canonical philosophers should constitute a structural obstacle for the integration 
of women? By questioning, rather than accepting, established authorities and conventions, even 
the most confrontational texts are part of a critical tradition that goes back to Socrates. In my 
view, it is not the discipline’s institutional and discursive structures that prevent these texts 
from making it into the canon. Philosophy has room for critical thinking. The discipline’s 
norms are not natural laws; they can be changed if necessary. Neither, as argued above, are 
texts written by women philosophers deficient a priori.  
The most likely explanation why texts written by women philosophers have not 
travelled through history as philosophical texts is, in my opinion, simply because women have 
written them. These texts are confronted with negative identity prejudices toward women, what 
Fricker describes as “widely held disparaging association between a social group and one or 
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more attributes, where this association embodies a generalization that displays […] resistance 
to counter-evidence […] resulting in […] systematic testimonial injustice.”58  
This view, that the most likely explanation for the non-travelling of women’s texts is 
gender bias does not rule out the fact that there are practical and methodological challenges to 
their integration. But inclusion is achievable, and several feminist philosophers have suggested 
how this can be done. O’Neil, for instance, suggests two possibilities. One is a “historical 
reconstruction” which includes the philosophers of both genders that have contributed to issues 
of central importance to the relevant epoch. The other is a “rational reconstruction” which 
includes philosopher of both genders who are engaging in topics of relevance to today’s 
philosophical discussions.59 O’Neill’s suggestions make it possible to have several gender-
inclusive canons based on different topics. Warren argues in favor of a chronological and 
dialogical approach, where women and men philosophers are presented in conversation with 
each other,60 an approach that expands the existing male canon by integrating women. It is also 
debated whether there should there be courses specializing in women philosophers, and if so, 
whether they should be optional or obligatory.61 Apart from differences on what the best 
solution to the methodological challenges is, there are in addition distinctive practical obstacles 
in each philosophy department depending on where they are located. But whatever the 
problems are, it is of the utmost importance to let the texts of women philosopher travel into 
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the canon and the history of philosophy. Practical and methodological challenges should not 
be allowed to prevent a solution to the problem of exclusion.  
By focusing on how philosophical text written by women have travelled, or been 
prevented from travelling, severely challenged the belief that canons are formed through 
centuries of unbiased selection of the very best philosophical works based on their intrinsic 
merits. Women did not lose in this competitive process because their work was not worthy of 
being preserved for later generations, but because gender have a distinct impact on how text 
travels. Even today, texts written by women philosophers – ironically also on past women 
philosophers – are not traveling into the discipline’s center. Differentiating between different 
types of travel – geographically, linguistically, historically and in which genre – reveals that 
these various travels are not always aligned with one another. Sophia, Trotter Cockburn and 
Maccauly were all engage with their contemporary geographical and philosophical circles, they 
were translated and acknowledge. However, despite geographical, linguistic and philosophical 
travelling in their own time, they did not travel historically. Also, Wollstonecraft and 
Beauvoir’s text travelled geographically and linguistically, and to some extent historically. But 
with the exception of feminist scholarship, they have not travelled philosophically.  
Gender might influence all the different journeys texts can take, but is particularly 
significant with regard to the historical and philosophical travelling of women’s texts and 
clearly demonstrates how gender hampers, and sometimes even inhibits, the circulation of 
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certain texts. Nevertheless, the study of the texts less travelled, as well as the mechanisms that 
have prevented them from traveling, also holds a potential for progress. It allows us to ask meta 
questions about methodology, epistemology, and ontology, scrutinize implicit biases in the 
concepts and premises of the discipline, ask new questions, and broaden our philosophical 
knowledge of several topics.62 It is time to let the works of women travel on an equal footing 
with men’s works, in philosophy as well as other disciplines, so that we can achieve more 
accurate, just and diverse transhistorical exchange of knowledge and ideas.  
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